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The Moral Responsibilities oj Physicians 
by Tom L. Beauchamp and Laurence B. McCullough 
New York: Prent ice-Hall, 1984. 172 pp., paper. $13.95. 
This book attempts to analyze many contemporary problems in medical eth ics according 
to the norms estab li shed by the principles of beneficence and autonomy. The a uthors 
contend that neither beneficence nor autonomy is sufficient to determine the ethically 
correct courses of action in va rious instances , and they a rgue in behalf of the dominance of 
the principle of beneficence limited by the principle of autonomy. Autonomy and 
beneficence are primafacie principles which can be overridden by other moral principles. 
but ordinarily cons iderations of utilit y or good consequences justify overriding these 
principles . They argue that the principle of beneficence must be weighed against various 
goods and harms caused by medical intervent ions , and this reduces to a uti litarian or 
consequentiali st reduction of the moral principles. The fundamental problem with this 
book is that the notions of beneficence and autonomy are made to carry too much freight, 
and more principles are needed. 
The authors admit that the autonomy-based model has crept into American medicine 
since 1972 and they appear to be uncomfortable with this development. The autonomy-
based model is a clear rejection of the convenant-based mod el espoused by Paul Ramsey, 
and the autonomy model in practice tends to eliminate the duties and~bligations to care for 
and treat patients. If pure contentless patient autonomy is the model for decision-making. 
the phys ician has no rights before the patient. The "therapeutic privilege" may be invo ked . 
but how it wou ld fare is not at all clear. 
Another fundamental problem with this theory of ethics is that medical-ethical problems 
are becoming more and more complicated and , des pite this fact. their theory is excess ively 
simplistic and formal. There is no material content give n to either the principles of 
beneficence or of autonomy. and the authors refuse to articulate any " middle principles" 
which would give material content to these principles. The result is that their application is 
highly co lo red by social and cultura l biases. In an age of increasing et hical co mplexity, this 
trend to make et hical theory purely formal and abstract should be inhibited rather than 
promoted. 
This book traces the hi story of these two principles and aims at determining what courses 
of action are ethica lly appropriate in various so rt s of "hard cases". The foundation for the 
beneficence model in the Hippocratic Oath is mentioned. but the force of the Oath is 
discounted by an assertion that it was an Oath adopted by a small religious sect a nd that the 
Oath was in conflict wit h itself because doing good so metimes required doing harm. The 
authors complete ly ignore the medieval and high scholastic periods of ethics and moral 
theo logy where fundamental and derived moral principles were given clear and specific 
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material content. The authors do not trace how the principle of autonomy was limited by 
the requirements of justice through the medieval legal and ethical period. 
The authors also try to determine when paternalistic actions may be justified. when 
autonomy can be limited by beneficence. Paternalism is defined as the intentional 
limitation of the autonomy of the patient in order to promote beneficence. They try to make 
these determinations by studying a hard case where a young man wanted to die rather than 
undergo painful and disfiguring burn treatments. He clearly wanted to die and control his 
own fate, but this was not to be permitted. Their study of this issue was hampered, however, 
because they failed to develop a theory which differentiates mandated treatments and 
electable care. Their theories of paternalism, autonomy and beneficence cannot generate 
these specific, concrete and practical principles and this calls into question all of their 
analyses. 
This book seems to have a preoccupation with rational suicide, and this concern seems to 
motivate the authors' study of paternalistic action. According to their principles, it is not 
clear how a paternalistic physician would be able to intervene to prohibit clear suicidal 
attempts by competent terminally ill patients. The authors object that permitting this 
would result only from a wooden reading of the principle of autonomy, but the principles of 
beneficence and paternalism are so formal and abstract that it is not clear why this reading 
would not be legitimate. 
Most argue for a limited paternalism policy. but it is difficult to determine the boundaries 
of this sort of policy. The authors distinguish between strong and weak paternalism and 
argue that weak paternalism collapses into the pure autonomy model. Weak paternalism 
holds that autonomy can be limited only if a patient is substantially non-autonomous, 
while strong paternalism holds that intervention can occur only when actions affect just the 
person himself. Both of these have their problems, as weak paternalism would probably 
permit a frightened stroke victim to go without protection, while strong paternalism would 
probably force useless and costly treatments on some patients. The authors need a theory of 
extraordinary medical treatments to explain why paternalism is justified in certain 
instances. They reduce the problem of paternalism to problems of autonomy and 
beneficence and call for a more comprehensive theory, but are unable to come to a clear and 
satisfactory resolution to their problems due to the abstractness of the fundamental 
principles they invoke. 
The authors attempt to resolve problems of treating patients with diminished 
competency and reduced autonomy, which is a serious problem because of their strong 
commitment to patient autonomy. They find it difficult to prohibit "rational suicide" 
because the principles requiring beneficence against clear and strongly autonomous 
decisions are very weak. Their judgments are hampered, howevq, by the lack of a theory 
of ordinary, required and mandatory medical treatments which cannot be withheld or 
rejected without violating justice. The authors seem uneasy with permitting rational 
suicide. but they cannot argue strongly against it because they do not believe that there are 
any medical treatments which must be provided and received. 
It would seem that suicide becomes a morally acceptable alternative in their theory 
because of the formal and abstract criteria they establish for reduced autonomy. If a patient 
can demonstrate that there are no external or internal constraints and show knowledge and 
understanding of a situation, then he or she could choose an action such as suicide by 
benign neglect. The language used to define external constraints is so vague, however, that 
it could never be clear if a person was free from them. The two writers develop conditions 
that limit autonomy. but they are not as precise as the traditional passion, fear, ignorance. 
Competence is ambiguously defined as the ability to perform a task. The criteria for 
competence are quite vague, such as the requirement that a rational reason for a choice be 
given. or the failure to give a risk ! benefit calculus. They recognize that labelinga person as 
incompetent can create all sorts of paternalistic events, but they hold that errors should be 
made on the beneficence side of the issue, even though it is difficult to decide what 
constitutes beneficence. To their credit. the authors recognize that determining or even 
defining competency is extremely difficult. Because of emotional factors or the inability of 
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a patient to accept the reality of a co nditi o n, a co mpetent jud gment may be difficult. 
Beauchamp and McCullough recogn ize that rationality or ab ilit y to understand a situation 
does not mea n that a patien t can make a competent dec ision. 
The authors c hallenge the notion that the physician must a lways act in the best interes ts 
of the patient and they hold that third party interests ma y be pro moted at t he expe nse of the 
patient in so me cases. They would allow psychological a nd e moti o nal conseque nces of 
treatment to justify withholding beneficial trea tme nts from infan ts, for insta nce. But the 
reasons they give for upholding third-party inte rests are quite vague, abstract. form a l and 
difficult to apply in concrete circumstances. They ho ld tha t the pa ti ent' s interes ts only 
impose a primajacie dut y that can be overridden when so d o ing brings about a grea ter 
good. 
Determining when one can promote third part y interests is done by weighing va rious 
harms and benefits, which is essentiall y a co nseq uen tialist ana lys is. The funda mental 
problem with this met hod o logy is that one never knows what harms and benefit s are to be 
includ ed and one ne ve r knows when to stop sea rc hing for vlllues to be weighed. Whe n they 
urge that patient interests either be upheld or overridden, the authors invoke benefice nce, 
but they neve r sho w why there is a clear dut y to act bene fi cently as beneficence cou ld 
plausibly compel action in another direction. They invoke the " best interests" standa rd 
either to warrant or prohibit paternalist ic action, but they ne ve r give pers uasive reasons 
why this purely formal standard requires their reco mmended action. 
This book was quite dissatisfying because it relies so lely on abstract and formal 
principles. The authors almost seem fearful of esta bli s hing concrete, binding moral norms 
for medical practice, and one suspects that they want medical-ethical norms to be purely 
formal so that these norms ca n be used to permit or prohibit whatever they desire. There is 
no discuss ion of basic human goods or the virtues, which is ve ry peculiar for a work in 
medical ethics. They seem to assume that justice will be achieved by merely acting 
beneficentl y or by protecting autonomy, however they a re defined. 
The formalit y and abstractness of contemporary ethics should be a matter of concern, as 
we now see a campaign to legali ze euthanasia brea king upon our co untry. There is virtually 
no mention of the dut y to trea t patients, and only occasionally is there any mention made ofa 
"therapeutic privilege". They fail to consider the nature of medical treatme nts and the 
conditions of patients to show how those impinge upon the moral character of judgments. 
This book seems to be an endorsement of the pure and contentless patient autonomy model 
which all but obliterates ethical duties and obligations of hea lth care providers. If it is true 
that thi s model is gaining do minance in our country, then it might be necessary to take 
measures to protect the duti es and obligations of physicia ns to proVi de care and trea tment 
for medically vulnerable persons. 
-Rev, Robert Barry, ,O,P" Ph,D , 
National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow 
Washington , D ,C. 
I deal, Fact, and Medicine 
by Charles J. Dougherty 
Ne>!' York: Universill' of America Press. 1985. 202 pp. 
"It might be said by some tha t thi s whole work is far too relativistic, that it accepts too 
easily the claim that there are other significant moral alternatives, and that it therefore 
provides no absolute foundation for the choice of these idea ls and the associated ethical 
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